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Abstract
Journals favor rejection of the null hypothesis. This selection
upon tests may distort the behavior of researchers. Using 50, 000
tests published between 2005 and 2011 in the AER, JPE, and QJE,
we identify a residual in the distribution of tests that cannot be
explained by selection. The distribution of p-values exhibits a two
humped camel shape with abundant p-values above 0.25, a valley
between 0.25 and 0.10, and a bump slightly below 0.05. The miss-
ing tests (with p-values between 0.25 and 0.10) can be retrieved just
after the 0.05 threshold and represent 10% to 20% of marginally re-
jected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers might be tempted
to inflate the value of those just-rejected tests by choosing a “signif-
icant” specification. We propose a method to measure this residual
and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.
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If the stars were mine
I’d give them all to you
I’d pluck them down right from the sky
And leave it only blue.
“If The Stars Were Mine” by Melody Gardot
1 Introduction
The introduction of norms—confidence at 95% or 90%—and the use of eye-
catchers—stars—have led the academic community to accept more easily
starry stories with marginally significant coefficients than starless ones with
marginally insignificant coefficients.1 As highlighted by Sterling (1959),
this effect has modified the selection of papers published in journals and
arguably biased publications toward tests rejecting the null hypothesis.
This selection is not unreasonable. The choice of a norm was precisely
made to strongly discriminate between rejected and accepted hypotheses.
A consequence of such selection is that researchers may anticipate and
consider that it is a stumbling block for their ideas to be considered. For in-
stance, they may censor their papers with too high p-values. They may also
search for specifications delivering just-significant results and ignore spec-
ifications giving just-insignificant results in order to increase their chances
of being published.2 The latter behavior has different implications on the
distribution of published tests than selection by journals. If selection by
journals is monotonically increasing with the value of test statistics, the
proportion of submitted papers that end up being published should in-
crease with the value of test statistics. We build on this assumption to
propose an accounting framework that can be applied to any distribution
of published test statistics. This method allows us to determine what could
be attributed to selection in the distribution of published statistics and ex-
tract a residual that cannot be explained by this selection process alone.
We thereafter refer to this residual as inflation because it should capture,
among other things, part of the behavioral response.
Why would we expect the distribution of published statistics to be in-
1Fisher (1925) institutionalized the significance levels. R. A. Fisher supposedly de-
cided to establish the 5% level since he was earning 5% of royalties for his publications.
It is however noticeable that, in economics, the academic community has converged to-
ward 10% as being the first hurdle to pass, maybe because of the stringency of the 5%
one.
2The choice of the right specification may depend on its capacity to detect an ef-
fect. For instance, authors may stop exploring further specifications when finding a
“significant” one. See, for instance, Bastardi et al. (2011), Nosek et al. (2012).
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consistent with an increasing probability of being published, and this in-
consistency to be related with researchers’ behaviors? Imagine that there
are three types of results, green lights are clearly rejected tests, red lights
clearly accepted tests and amber lights uncertain tests, i.e. close to the
5% or 10% statistical significance thresholds but not there yet. Assume (i)
that it is easier for researchers to produce a green test when first confronted
with an amber one rather than with a red one and (ii) that the marginal
gains of turning from amber to green are higher than changing from red
to amber. In this case, there would be a shift in the observed distribution
of statistics due to amber tests being transformed into green tests and this
pattern would be inconsistent with our assumption on selection. Indeed,
there would be a shortage of amber tests relatively to green tests, which is
consistent with selection, but there would also be a shortage of amber tests
relatively to red tests. Graphically, we should observe (i) a first bump, (ii)
a valley (not enough tests with p-values around 0.15 as if they were disliked
relatively to tests with p-values of 0.30) and (iii) the echoing bump (too
many tests with p-values slightly under 0.05 as if they were preferred to
tests with p-values below 0.001).
We find empirical evidence for this two humped pattern. The distribu-
tion of test statistics published in three of the most prestigious economic
journals over the period 2005–2011 exhibits a sizable under-representation
of marginally insignificant statistics relatively to significant statistics but
also to (very) insignificant ones. In a nutshell, once tests are normalized
as z-statistics, the distribution has a two humped camel shape with (i) a
first hump for low z-statistics, (ii) missing z-statistics between 1.2 and 1.65
(p-values between 0.25 and 0.10) with a local minimum around 1.5 (p-value
of 0.12), and (iii) a second hump between 2 and 4 (p-values slightly below
0.05). Our accounting framework allows us to show that this non-monotonic
pattern cannot be explained by selection alone under the assumption that
selection should be weakly increasing in the z-statistics. There is a large
residual that we henceforth refer to as inflation. We find that 10% to 20%
percent of tests with p-values between 0.05 and 0.0001 are misallocated :
there are missing test statistics just before the 0.10 threshold that we can
retrieve after the 0.05 threshold.3
3It is theoretically difficult to separate the estimation of behavioral response of re-
searchers from selection: one may interpret selection and its response as the equilibrium
outcome of a game played by editors/referees and authors as in the model of Henry
(2009). Editors and referees prefer to publish results that are “significant”. Authors are
tempted to inflate (with a cost), which pushes editors toward being even more conserva-
tive thereby exacerbating selection and inflation. A strong empirical argument in favor
of this game between editors/referees and authors would be an increasing selection even
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The two-humped camel shape is unlikely to be due to journals favoring
green tests and red tests over amber tests. Indeed, we collect a broad range
of information on each paper and author and compare the distribution of
published tests along various dimensions. While the two-humped shape is
an empirical regularity that can be observed consistently across journals,
years and fields, it is much less pronounced in articles where stars are not
used as eye-catchers. To make a parallel with central banks, the choice not
to use eye-catchers might be considered as a commitment from authors to
keep inflation low.4 Importantly, we show that the pattern we document is
not driven by the co-existence of null and positive empirical results. Simi-
larly, the two-humped camel shape is less visible in articles with theoretical
models, articles using data from randomized control trials or laboratory
experiments and papers published by tenured and older researchers. More
generally, we find a larger residual in cases in which we would expect higher
incentives for researchers to respond to selection.
While many papers compare the density of marginally insignificant tests
to marginally significant tests, there is surprisingly little work incorporating
the whole distribution of p-values in the analysis. To our knowledge, this
project is the first paper that focuses on the two-humped pattern in the
distribution of published tests. Using the whole distribution of p-values,
we propose an accounting framework to measure what can be explained by
selection and what cannot. To achieve this, we collect a very large number
of test statistics published in the American Economic Review, the Journal
of Political Economy, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics between 2005
and 2011. This collecting process generated 50, 078 tests grouped in 3, 389
tables (or results subsections) and 641 articles. This large number of tests
allows us to uncover subtle patterns in the distribution of published tests,
and perform subsample analyses by authors and articles characteristics.
The literature on tests in economics was flourishing in the 1980s and has
already shown the importance of strategic choices of specifications from au-
thors.5 For instance, Leamer and Leonard (1983) and Leamer (1985) point
out the fact that inferences drawn from coefficients estimated in linear re-
gressions are very sensitive to the underlying econometric model. They
below 0.05, i.e. editors challenge the credibility of rejected tests. Our findings do not
seem to support this pattern.
4However, such a causal interpretation might be challenged: researchers may give
up on stars precisely when their use is less relevant, either because coefficients are very
significant and the test of nullity is not a particular concern or because coefficients are
not significant.
5See Lovell (1983), Denton (1985), De Long and Lang (1992) for a discussion on the
implications of individual and collective data mining.
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suggest to display the range of inferences generated by a set of models.
Leamer (1983) rules out the myth inherited from the physical sciences that
econometric inferences are independent of priors: it is possible to exhibit
both a positive and a negative effect of capital punishment on crime de-
pending on priors on the acceptable specification. More recently, Gelman
and Loken (2014) discuss how data analysis choices can be data-dependent
even when the tested hypothesis is motivated directly from theoretical con-
cerns. One contribution of our paper is to document a possible outcome of
such strategic choices of specifications.
Our paper also relates to the vast literature on the so-called file drawer
problem or selection bias: statistics with low values are censored by jour-
nals (see Rosenthal 1979 and Stanley 2005 for reviews, and Hedges 1992,
Doucouliagos and Stanley 2011 and for a generalized method to identify
reporting bias). A large number of publications quantify the extent to
which selection distorts published results (see Ashenfelter and Greenstone
2004 or Begg and Mazumdar 1994). Ashenfelter et al. (1999) propose a
meta-analysis of the Mincer equation showing a selection bias in favor of
significant and positive returns to education. Card and Krueger (1995) and
Doucouliagos et al. (2011) are two other examples of meta-analysis dealing
with publication bias. More recently, Havra´nek (2015) uses a meta-analysis
of intertemporal substitution estimates and discusses bias that results from
selective reporting practices.
The selection issue has also received a great deal of attention in the
medical literature (Berlin et al. 1989, Ioannidis 2005, Ridley et al. 2007)
and in psychological science (Bastardi et al. 2011, Fanelli 2010a, Simmons
et al. 2011). In addition, Auspurg and Hinz (2011), Gerber and Malhotra
(2008b), Gerber and Malhotra (2008a), Gerber et al. (2010) and Masicampo
and Lalande (2012) collect distributions of tests in journals in sociology,
political science and psychology.6 We differ from that literature in one
important dimension as we are not interested in selection by journals per
se but in the consequences that it may imply on researchers’ behavior. This
relates our paper to recent empirical work by Franco et al. (2014) on the
stage of research production at which selection occurs. Franco et al. (2014)
show that most of the selection occurs before submission: authors do not
write up, nor submit, null findings.
Finally, our identification method differs from existing methods. Most
articles look for discontinuities or bunching around key significance thresh-
olds (e.g. Gerber and Malhotra 2008b) while we are interested in the whole
6See Fanelli (2010b) for a related discussion about the hierarchy of sciences.
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distribution of test statistics. A recent paper by Simonsohn et al. (2014)
also uses a less local analysis. Simonsohn et al. (2014) use distortions in
the distribution of p-values below the .05 threshold in order to detect “p-
hacking” (too many p-values just below the .05 threshold). In contrast, our
method looks at the distortions above the .05 threshold (too few p-values
just above the .05 threshold).
Section 2 details the methodology to construct the dataset and provides
some information on test meta-data. Section 3 documents the distribution
of tests. Section 4 proposes a method to decompose the observed distribu-
tion of published statistics into what can be explained by selection and a
residual. Finally, we discuss the results of this method in section 5.
2 Data
In this section, we describe the reporting process of tests published in the
American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, and the
Quarterly Journal of Economics between 2005 and 2011. We then provide
some descriptive statistics.
2.1 Reporting process
One major issue is to select test statistics that represent key hypotheses.
Most articles in the file-drawer literature collect all statistics because their
identification only relies on discontinuities around significance thresholds.
Instead, we want to capture the whole distribution of “central” test statis-
tics. In this regard, we use a subjective, or narrative, approach.
In our narrative approach, we consider, as in Gerber and Malhotra
(2008a), that not all coefficients reported in tables should be considered as
tests of central hypotheses.7 We identify variables of interest by looking at
the tables and table footnotes and by reading the text where the regres-
sions’ results are described. We thus omit explicit control variables. In
addition, we do not report explicit placebo tests, i.e. statistical tests that
the authors expect to fail. In the rare occurrences in which the status of a
test was unclear when reading the paper, we prefer to add a non-relevant
test than to censor a relevant one. As we are only interested in tests of
7In practice, the large majority of those tests are two-sided tests of regression co-
efficients and are implicitly discussed in the body of the article (i.e. “coefficients are
significant”). 85% of collected test are presented using a regression coefficient and its
associated standard error. To simplify the exposition we explain the process as if we
only had two-sided tests for regression coefficients but the description applies to our
treatment of other tests.
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central hypotheses of articles, we also exclude descriptive statistics or group
comparisons.8 A specific rule concerns two-stage procedures. We do not
report first-stages, except if the first-stage is described by the authors as
a major contribution of the article. We also collect separately tests in ex-
tensions or robustness tests. Our narrative approach is better described in
the Online Appendix.
Our strategy is different from Gerber and Malhotra (2008a) which only
includes articles listing a set of specific hypotheses prior to presenting the
tests results. One advantage is that we keep a much larger sample of papers.
The obvious defect is that our selection implies some subjective choices.
We report numbers exactly as they are presented in articles, i.e. we
never round them up or down. We describe in the next subsection how the
data is uniformized across the different articles.
We report some additional information on each test, i.e. the issue of the
journal, the starting page of the article and the position of the test in the
article, its type (one-sided, two-sided, correlation test, etc.) and the status
of the test in the article (main or non-main). We prefer to be conservative
and only attribute the status of “non-main” statistics if evidence are clearly
presented as “complementary,”“additional” or “robustness checks.” We also
keep track of whether authors present some null empirical results as im-
portant contribution. Finally, the number of authors, the research field,
JEL codes when available, the presence of a theoretical model, the type of
data (laboratory experiment, randomized control trials or other), the use
of eye-catchers (stars or other formatting tricks such as bold printing), the
number of research assistants and researchers the authors wish to thank,
the rate of tenure among authors and data and code availability on the
website of the journal are also recorded. We do not report the sample size
and the number of variables (regressors) as this information is not always
provided by the authors. Exhaustive reporting rules are presented in the
Online Appendix.
We also collected information from curricula vitae of all the authors who
published in the three journals over the period of interest. We gathered
information about academic affiliation at the time of the publication, the
position at the main institution (assistant professor, associate professor,
etc.), whether the author is or was an editor (or a member of an editorial
board) of an economic journal, and the year and the institution where the
PhD was earned.
8A notable exception to this rule was made for experimental papers where results are
sometimes presented as mean comparisons across groups.
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2.2 Descriptive statistics
The reporting process described above provides 50, 078 tests. Journals do
not contribute equally: most of the tests come from the American Eco-
nomic Review, closely followed by the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
The Journal of Political Economy provides a little less than a fifth of the
sample. Out of the 50, 078 tests extracted from the three journals, around
30, 000 are rejected at the 10% significance level, 27, 000 at 5%, and 21, 000
at 1%.
Table 1 gives the decomposition of tests along several dimensions. The
average number of test statistics per article equals 78. It is surprisingly
high but it is mainly driven by some articles with a very large number of
statistics reported. The median article reports 58 statistics and 5 tables.
These figures are reasonable as tests are usually diluted in many different
empirical specifications. Most papers test two or three central hypotheses.
If, for each of the three hypotheses, there are 20 specifications (4 tables
and 5 different specifications per table), we would report 60 statistics, a bit
more than our median article. In order to alleviate the issue of potential
irrelevant statistics, we further adjust the weight of each test statistics by
the number of such statistics in the article such that an article with only
one statistic contributes as much as one with 300 statistics.
A rough categorization of article into two large research fields reveals
that on fourth are macro-oriented while the remaining are micro-oriented.
Most articles report positive empirical findings. Papers that report null and
mixed (both positive and null) results represent respectively 2% and 13% of
the total number of articles. More than half of the articles use eye-catchers
defined as the presence of stars or bold printing in a table, excluding the
explicit display of p-values. These starry tests represent more than sixty
percent of the total number of tests (the average number of tests is higher
in articles using eye-catchers). More than seventy percent of tables from
which tests are extracted are considered as main. More than a third of the
articles in our sample explicitly rely on a theoretical framework but when
they do so, the number of tests provided is not particularly smaller than
when they do not. Only a fifth of articles are single-authored.9
Tests using data from laboratory experiments or randomized control
trials constitute a small part of the overall sample. To be more precise,
the AER publishes relatively more experimental articles while the QJE
9See Card and DellaVigna (2014, 2013) for recent studies about top journals in eco-
nomics.
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seems to favor randomized controlled trials. The overall contribution of
both types is equivalent (with twice as many laboratory experiments than
randomized experiments but more tests in the latter than in the former).
3 The distribution of tests
In this section, we describe the raw distribution of tests and propose meth-
ods to alleviate the over-representation of round values and the potential
overweight attributed to articles with many test statistics. We then derive
the distribution of test statistics and comment on it.
The collecting process groups three types of measures: p-values, test
statistics when directly reported by the authors, and coefficients and stan-
dard errors for the vast majority of tests. In order to obtain a homogeneous
sample, we transform p-values into the equivalent z-statistics (a p-value
of 0.05 becomes 1.96). For tests reported using coefficients and standard
errors, we simply construct the ratio of the two.10 Recall that the distri-
bution of a t-statistic depends on the degrees of freedom, while that of a
z-statistic is standard normal. As we are unable to reconstruct the de-
grees of freedom for all tests, we treat these ratios as if they were following
an asymptotically standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis.
Consequently, when the sample size is small, the level of rejection we use is
not adequate. For instance, some tests for which we associate a z-statistic
of z = 1.97 might not be rejected at the 5% significance threshold.
The transformation into z-statistic allows us to observe more easily the
fat tail of tests (with small p-values). Figure 1(a) presents the raw distri-
bution. Remark that a very large number of p-values end up below the
0.05 significance threshold (more than 50% of tests are rejected at this
significance level).
Two potential issues may be raised with the way authors report the
value of their tests and the way we reconstruct the underlying statistics.
First, rational numbers that can be expressed as ratios of small integers
get over-represented because of the low precision used by authors. For
instance, if the estimate is reported to be 0.020 and the standard error
is 0.010, then our reconstructed z-statistic would be exactly 2. Second,
more than 100 values are reported in some articles against 4 or 5 in others.
10These transformations allow us to obtain direct or reconstructed statistics for all
but three types of tests collected: (i) tests reported as a zero p-value, (ii) tests reported
as a p-value lower than a threshold (e.g. p < 0.001), and (iii) tests reported with a zero
standard error. These three cases represent 727 tests, i.e. 1.45% of the total sample.
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Which weights are we suppose to give to the former and the latter in the
final distribution? This issue might be of particular concern as authors
might choose the number of tests they report depending on how close or
far they are from the thresholds.11
To alleviate the first issue, we randomly redraw a number in the interval
of potentially true numbers around each collected value. We achieve this
by looking at the number of reported digits. In the example given above,
the true estimate should lie in the interval [0.0195, 0.0205] and the true
standard error in the interval [0.0095, 0.0105] (with a reported estimate
of 0.02 instead of 0.020, the interval would have been [0.015, 0.025]). We
independently redraw an estimate and a standard error in these intervals
using a uniform distribution, and then reconstruct a z-statistics thanks to
these two random numbers. This reallocation is mostly aesthetic and has
very little impact on the analysis: we reallocate z-statistics very close to
their initial level. Consequently, we smooth potential discontinuities in
histograms but we do not change the overall shape of the distribution.12
Note, however, that such reallocation would affect a discontinuity analysis
around significance thresholds.
To alleviate the second issue, we construct two different sets of weights,
accounting for the number of tests per article and per table in each article.
For the first set of weights, we associate to each test the inverse of the num-
ber of tests presented in the same article such that each article contributes
the same to the distribution. For the second set of weights, we associate
the inverse of the number of tests presented in the same table (or result
sub-section) multiplied by the inverse of the number of tables in the article
such that each article contributes the same to the distribution and tables
of a same article have equal weights.
Figure 1(b) presents the de-rounded distribution.13 The shape is strik-
ing. The distribution presents a two-humped camel pattern with a local
minimum around z = 1.5 (p-value of 0.12) and a local maximum around
2 (p-value under 0.05). The presence of a local maximum around 2 is not
very surprising, the existence of a valley before more so. Intuitively, the
11For example, one might conjecture that authors report more tests when the p-values
are closer to the significance thresholds. Conversely, one may also choose to display a
small number of satisfying tests as others tests would fail.
12For statistics close to significance levels, we could have taken advantage of the in-
formation embedded in the presence of a star. However, this approach could only have
been implemented for a much reduced number of observations and only in cases where
stars are used.
13In what follows, we use the word “de-rounded” to refer to statistics to which we
applied the method described above.
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“natural” distribution of tests, e.g. Student distributions under the null hy-
pothesis, is likely to have a decreasing pattern over the whole interval. On
the other hand, selection could explain a monotonically increasing pattern
for the distribution of z-statistics at the beginning of the interval [0,∞).
Both effects put together could explain the presence of a unique local max-
imum, a local minimum before, less so. Our empirical strategy will consist
in capturing this non-monotonicity and quantifying this shift in the distri-
bution of tests.14
Figures 1(c) and (d) present the weighted distributions of de-rounded
statistics. The camel shape is more pronounced than for the unweighted
distributions. A simple explanation is that weighted distributions under-
weight articles and tables for which a lot of tests are reported. For these
articles and tables, our way to report tests might have included tests of
non-central hypotheses.
The pattern shown in figures 1(b)–(d) is a very robust empirical regular-
ity: the pattern can be seen in any journal and in any year. In addition, as
shown by figures presented in the Online Appendix, this empirical regular-
ity is similar between main tests and robustness checks and we do not gain
much insights by analyzing separately“complementary,”“additional”or“ro-
bustness checks.” However, the empirical regularity is much less acute when
we explicitly select the articles from which we extract our tests by impor-
tant author or article characteristics. For example, the camel shape is less
pronounced in articles without eye-catchers and articles with a theoretical
contribution. Similarly, the two-humped camel shape is less pronounced
in papers written by senior researchers regardless of whether seniority is
captured by years since PhD, tenure or editorial responsibilities. In con-
trast, it does not vary by data and codes availability on journals’ website.
This bird’s-eye-view across subsamples indicates that there is some het-
erogeneity in the extent to which amber tests are under-represented and
this heterogeneity can be related to author and article characteristics. We
14It is important to have in mind that our identification does not rely on the discon-
tinuity around significance threshold but rather on the non-monotonic pattern around
this threshold. In the Online Appendix, we nonetheless test for discontinuities. We find
evidence that the total distribution of tests presents a small discontinuity around the
0.10 significance threshold, but not much around the 0.05 or the 0.01 thresholds. This
modest effect might be explained by (i) our de-rounding process and by (ii) the dilu-
tion of hypotheses tested in journal articles. In the absence of a single test, empirical
economists provide many converging arguments under the form of different specifications
for a single effect. Besides, an empirical article is often dedicated to the identification of
more than one mechanism. As such, the real statistic related to an article is a distribu-
tion or a set of arguments and this dilution may smooth potential discrepancies around
thresholds. The Online Appendix also presents an analysis using Benford’s law to look
for manipulation in reported coefficients and standard errors.
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come back to the analysis of heterogeneity across sub-samples in section 5
where we apply our accounting framework, but this heterogeneity tends to
support the interpretation that such a shape results from author behavior.
4 A method to measure inflation
In this section, we provide a purely accounting framework which aims at
separating a residual, inflation, from selection. We first present a very
simple descriptive model of selection in academic publishing and define
selection in this context. We then decompose any distribution of published
statistics into what could be generated by such selection and a residual.
Finally, we discuss stories that may challenge our interpretation of this
residual, i.e. mechanisms that could enter the residual without reflecting
a behavioral response from researchers. We present the intuition of the
accounting decomposition in what follows.
For each possible value of test statistics, consider the proportion of sub-
mitted working papers that end up being published. If we assume that
selection is monotonically increasing with the value of test statistics, all
other things being equal, we should observe that the proportion of sub-
mitted papers that end up being published increases with the value of test
statistics. Non-monotonic patterns in the distribution of test statistics, like
in the case of a two humped shape, cannot be explained by selection alone.
The valley and the echoing bump that we have uncovered in the previous
section will thus be captured by the residual, inflation, after estimating
how a monotonic selection process fits the observed distribution.
4.1 Notations
We consider a simple process of selection into journals. We abstract from
authors and directly consider the universe of working papers as given.15
Each economic working paper has a unique hypothesis which is tested with
a unique specification. Denote by z the absolute value of the statistics
associated to this test16 and ϕ(.) the density of its distribution over the
universe of working papers, the input.
A unique journal gives a value f(z, ε) to each working paper where ε
15Note that the selection of potential economic issues into a working paper is not
modeled here. One can think alternatively that this is the universe of potential ideas
and selection would then include the process from the “choice” of idea to publication.
16Alternatively, you could see this unique z as the average test statistics of a given
paper.
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is a noise entering into the selection process in addition to the value z.
ε, the noise, may capture a lot of dimensions: the inclinations of journals
for certain articles, the importance of the question, the originality of the
methodology, the quality of the paper and, most importantly, the behav-
ioral responses of researchers. Working papers are accepted for publication
as long as they pass a certain threshold F , i.e. f(z, ε) ≥ F . Suppose with-
out loss of generality that f is strictly increasing in ε, such that a high ε
corresponds to articles with higher likelihood to be published, for the same
z. Denote by Gz the distribution of ε conditional on the value of z. This
distribution will capture variations in the probability to be published that
are orthogonal to selection. Indeed, the density of tests observed in journals
– the output – can be written as:
ψ(z) =
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz
.
The observed density of tests ψ(z) for a given z depends on the share of ar-
ticles with ε sufficiently high to pass the threshold (
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
)
and on the number of such articles, i.e. input (ϕ(z)). As the value of z
changes, the minimum noise ε required to pass the threshold changes: it is
easier to get in, this is the selection effect and it only reflects properties of
the function f . In our framework, the distribution Gz of this ε may also
change conditionally on z. Any such changes in the distribution of noise to
conditional on z will be the residuals to selection. For instance, a shortage
of amber tests would correspond to a local shift in the distribution of noise
Gz: there would be too many accepted working papers in the green zone
(Gz would tilt toward high ε) compared to the amber zone (Gz would tilt
toward low ε).
With these notations, changes in observed ψ(z) that cannot be at-
tributed to selection are, by construction, attributed to Gz, the residual.
4.2 Selection
Our empirical strategy consists in estimating how well selection explains
differences between the input distribution and the observed distribution of
statistics. To this end, we need to characterize selection, i.e. to define the
set of selection functions f that can model the attitude of journals.
Let us assume that we know the input distribution ϕ. The ratio of the
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output density to the input density can be written as:
ψ(z)/ϕ(z) =
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz
.
This quantity ψ(z)/ϕ(z) can be thought of as the proportion of sub-
mitted working papers that end up being published for a given z. In this
framework, once normalized by the input, the output is a function of the
selection function f . We impose the following condition on selection func-
tions:
Assumption 1 (Journals like stars). The function f is (weakly) increasing
in z.
For a same noisy component ε, journals prefer higher z. Everything else
equal, a 10% test is never strictly preferred to a 9% one.
On the one hand, this assumption can be conservative because it may
attribute to selection some patterns due to the behavior of researchers. For
instance, researchers may censor themselves. Thus, we think that we cap-
ture more than only selection by journals, we capture in effect all behaviors
that select monotonically along the value of a test statistics.
On the other hand, the assumption that journals prefer tests rejecting
the null may not be viable for high z-statistics. Such results could indicate
an empirical misspecification to referees. This effect, if present, should only
appear for very large statistics. Another concern is that journals may also
appreciate clear acceptance of the null hypothesis, in which case the selec-
tion function would be initially decreasing. We discuss in greater details
the mechanisms challenging our assumption at the end of this section.
In the following lines, we characterize the distributions of statistics that
are associated with selection functions satisfying assumption 1. We show
that, when Gz is independent from z, there is a correspondence between
the set of such functions and the set of observed distributions ψ such that
ψ(z)/ϕ(z) is weakly increasing in z.
First, if we shut down any other channels than selection (the distri-
bution of noise is independent of z), there is an increasing pattern in the
selection process, i.e. the proportion of articles selected ψ(z)/ϕ(z) should
be weakly increasing in z. Indeed, a higher z-statistic is associated with
a lower minimum noise ε required to pass the threshold F . As a result,
the pool of papers that have an ε sufficiently high to become eligible for
publication increases with z. Hence, for any distribution of noise G, the
proportion of submitted working papers that end up being published always
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weakly increases with the value of z and we cannot explain any decrease
in this ratio with selection alone: there are proportionally more working
papers that end up being published for higher value of test statistics.
Second and this is the purpose of the lemma below, the reciprocal is
also true: any increasing pattern for the ratio output to input ψ(z)/ϕ(z)
can be rationalized by selection alone, i.e. with a distribution of noise G˜
invariant in z. Any increasing function of z (in a reasonable interval) for
the ratio of densities can be generated by a certain function f verifying
assumption 1 maintaining the distribution of noise invariant in z. With an
increasing ratio of densities, all can be explained by selection.
Lemma 1 (Duality). Given a selection function f , any increasing function
r : [0, Tlim] 7→ [0, 1] (ratio) can be represented by a cumulative distribution
of quality ε ∼ G˜, where G˜ is invariant in z:
∀t, r(z) =
∫ ∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdG˜(ε)dε
]
G˜ is uniquely defined on the subsample {ε,∃z ∈ [0,∞), f(z, ε) = F}, i.e.
on the values of noise for which some articles may be rejected (with in-
significant tests) and some others accepted (with significant tests).
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.3 Estimation
Following this lemma, our empirical strategy consists in the estimation of
the best-fitting non-parametric increasing function r˜ ∈ Z = {r ∈ C([0, z¯]), s.t.r(z) ≥
r(z
′
) ⇔ z ≥ z′} for the ratio ψ(z)/ϕ(z). We find the weakly increasing r˜
that minimizes the weighted distance with the ratio ψ(z)/ϕ(z):
min
r˜∈Z
∑
i
[ψ(zi)/ϕ(zi)− r˜(zi)]2 ϕ(zi),
where i is the test’s identifier. The term r˜ is what can be explained by
selection in the ratio of distribution ψ(z)/ϕ(z), but what is the residual of
this estimation?
The following corollary relates the error term of the previous estimation
to the number of statistics unexplained by selection, i.e. our residual.
Corollary 1 (Residual). Following the previous lemma, there exists a
cumulative distribution G˜ which represents r˜. G˜ is uniquely defined on
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{ε,∃z ∈ [0, Tlim], f(z, ε) = F} and satisfies:
∀t, r˜(z) =
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdG˜(ε)dε
]
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz
.
The residual of the previous estimation can be written as the difference
between G˜ and the true Gz:
u(z) =
G˜(h(z))−Gz(h(z))∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz
,
where h is defined as f(z, ε) ≥ F ⇔ ε ≥ h(z).
Proof. In the Appendix.
The quantity u is the residual implied by the component of the observed
ratio that cannot be rationalized by a monotonically increasing selection
function f and a distribution of noise G˜ independent of z. Indeed, letting
ψ˜(z) = (1− G˜(h(z)))ϕ(z) denote the density of z-statistics associated with
G˜, the cumulated residual, i.e. the difference between the observed and
explained densities of z-statistics, is:∫ z
0
ψ(τ)dτ −
∫ z
0
ψ˜(τ)dτ =
∫ z
0
u(τ)ϕ(τ)dτ.
This corollary allows us to map the cumulated error term of the estimation
with a quantity that can be easily interpreted:
∫ z
0
ψ(τ)dτ−∫ z
0
ψ˜(τ)dτ is the
number of z-statistics within [0, z] that cannot be explained by a selection
function satisfying assumption 1. When positive (negative), we interpret
this residual as an excess (shortage) of z-statistics relative to the input dis-
tribution that cannot be explained by a monotonically increasing selection
process alone.
To conclude, we have developed a simple accounting framework that
decomposes the ratio of observed densities to input into a monotonically
increasing selection component and an unexplained component – a residual.
We argue that this unexplained component captures, among other things,
the behavioral responses of researchers. A difficulty arises in practice. The
previous strategy can be implemented non-parametrically for any given
input distribution. Which input distribution should we consider? We turn
to this question now.
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4.4 Input
In the process that occurs before publication, there are several choices that
impact the final distribution of tests: the choice of the research question, the
dataset, the decision to submit and the acceptance of referees. For instance,
Franco et al. (2014) show that some selection occurs before the submission
stage: authors do not submit null results. We think that most of these
processes are very likely to satisfy assumption 1 (at least for z-statistics
that are not extremely high) and these choices, i.e., research question, data
analysis choices (see Gelman and Loken (2014)), submission and acceptance
(see Franco et al. (2014)), will be captured by the selection process f .
Since we do not observe a“natural”distribution of tests before all choices
are made, we consider a large range of distributions for the input. The
classes of distribution can be limited to (i) unimodal distributions – with
the mode being 0 – because the output for some of our subsamples are
unimodal17 in 0, and (ii) ratio distributions because the vast majority of
our tests are ratio tests. They should also capture as much as possible of
the fat tail of the observed distribution (distributions should allow for a
large number of rejected tests and very high z-statistics). In line with these
observations, we consider three candidate classes.
Class 1 (Gaussian). The Gaussian/Student distribution class arises as the
distribution class under the null hypothesis of t-tests. Under the hypothesis
that tests are t-tests for independent random processes following normal
distributions centered in 0, the underlying distribution is a standard normal
distribution (if all tests are carried out with infinite degrees of freedom), or
a mix of Student distributions (in the case with finite degrees of freedom).
This class of distributions naturally arises under the assumption that
the underlying null hypotheses are always true. For instance, tests of cor-
relations between variables that are randomly chosen from a pool of uncor-
related processes would follow such distributions. However, we know from
the descriptive statistics that selection should be quite drastic when we con-
sider a normal distribution for the exogenous input. The output displays
more than 50% of rejected tests against 5% for the normal distribution. A
normal distribution would rule out the existence of statistics around 10. In
order to account for the fat tail observed in the data, we extend the class
of exogenous inputs to Cauchy distributions. Remark that the ratio of two
normal distributions follows a Cauchy distribution. In that respect, the
17If the selection function is increasing and the output is an unimodal distribution in
0, then the input needs to be a unimodal distribution in 0.
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class of Cauchy distributions satisfies all the ad hoc criteria that we wish
to impose on the input.
Class 2 (Cauchy). The Cauchy distributions are fat-tail ratio distributions
which extend the Gaussian/Student distributions: (i) the standard Cauchy
distribution coincides with the Student distribution with 1 degree of freedom,
(ii) this distribution class is, in addition, a strictly stable distribution.
Cauchy distributions account for the fact that researchers identify mech-
anisms among a set of correlated processes, for which the null hypothesis
might be false. As such, the Cauchy distribution allows us to extend the
input to fat-tail distributions.
The last class are distributions that we derive empirically by performing
random tests on large datasets.18
Class 3 (Empirical). We randomly draw variables from a dataset, run
2, 000, 000 regressions between these variables, and collect the z-statistic be-
hind the first explanatory variable. We apply this procedure to four different
datasets: the World Development Indicators (WDI), the Quality of Gov-
ernment dataset (QOG), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and
the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS).19
How do these different classes of distributions compare to the observed
distribution of published tests?
Figures 2(a) and (b) show how poorly the normal distribution fits the
observed distribution. The assumption that the input comes from uncorre-
lated processes can only be reconciled with the observed output through a
drastic selection (which would generate the observed fat tail from a Gaus-
sian tail). The fit is slightly better for the Student distribution of degree
1. The proportion of rejected tests is then much higher with 44% of re-
jected tests at the 0.05 significance level and 35% at 0.01. Figures 2(c)–(f)
show that the Cauchy distributions as well as the empirical inputs may
help to capture the fat tail of the observed distribution. More than the
levels of the densities, it is their shape which advocates in favor of the use
of these distributions as inputs: if we suppose that selection and inflation
become much less intense, if not absent, once we pass a certain threshold,
we should indeed observe a constant ratio output/input for these very high
z-statistics.
18Another potential empirical input could also be the statistics of non-central tests in
published papers, such as the significance of control variables for instance.
19So, we just ran eight million regressions (see Sala-i Martin 1997 and Hendry and
Krolzig 2004).
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From that discussion, we extract candidates that cover the range of
possible distributions. We keep (i) empirical inputs, (ii) the Student(1)
distribution; (iii) and a rather thin-tail distribution, i.e. the Cauchy dis-
tribution of parameter 0.5. These distributions cover a large spectrum of
shapes and our results are not sensitive to the choice of inputs.
4.5 Discussion
The quantity that we isolate is a cumulated residual (the difference between
the observed and the predicted cumulative function of z-statistics) that
cannot be explained by a monotonically increasing selection process alone.
In our interpretation, it should capture the observed local shift of z-statistics
that turns amber tests into green ones. This quantity may be a lower
bound of inflation as any globally increasing pattern (in z) in the inflation
mechanism would be captured as part of the selection effect. Only the
fact that this inflation is particularly acute for just-insignificant tests is
captured here.
Some observations may challenge our interpretation.
First, the selection function by journals may not be increasing because
a well-estimated zero, i.e. a null results, might be valued by journals. Our
two-humped shape may come from the aggregation of two very different
types of papers, one with a mode around 0, and one with a mode around
2. Indeed, some editors may favor well-estimated zeros or well-estimated
zeros could be valued differently across fields. The first hump would then
come from papers associated to one type of editors or one group of research
fields and our second hump would be associated with the other type. In
order to discard this interpretation, we perform a series of subsample de-
compositions. In a first step, we isolate the 16 papers having stated a null
result as their main contribution. As shown by figure 3(a), the distribu-
tion of z-statistics for papers with a null result for the main hypothesis is
unimodal with a mode around 0. In spite of the markedly different pattern
shown in these papers, there are not enough of them to explain the pres-
ence of a first hump in the whole distribution. Indeed, in figure 3(b), we
exclude all papers in which there is at least one null result presented for
one important hypothesis (15% of the sample), and the shape is remarkably
similar to our benchmark distribution. We also perform a decomposition
by economic fields to check that our results are not driven by the pres-
ence of well-estimated zeros in a particular field. One may think that
applied microeconomists put more emphasis on the precision of estimates
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(large number of observations) and the method (random or quasi-random
experiments) while there are usually less observations in macro analyses.
Figures 3(c) and (d) display the decomposition between micro- and macro-
oriented articles. We find similar patterns for the two distributions. Fur-
ther (unreported) decompositions into more disaggregated subfields, e.g.,
labor, development or trade, show no singularity in any subfield. Finally,
the preference for well-estimated zeros should not depend on article and
author characteristics. Yet, as shown later, we find that distributions of
z-statistics vary with these features and we can find subsamples in which
the second hump is almost absent.
Second, imagine that the authors could predict where their tests will
end up and decide to invest in the empirical investigation accordingly. This
ex ante selection is captured by the selection term as long as it displays an
increasing pattern, i.e. projects with expected higher z-statistics are more
likely to be undertaken. There is a very common setting in which it is
unlikely to be the case: when designing experiments (or randomized con-
trol trials), researchers compute power tests such as to derive the minimum
number of participants for which an effect can be statistically captured.
Experiments are expensive and costs need to be minimized under the con-
dition that a test may settle whether the hypothesis can or cannot be
rejected. We should expect a thinner tail for those experimental settings
and this is exactly what we observe. In such instance, our assumptions fail
and the results that we produce are to be taken with a grain of salt because
the residual then captures these missing large z-statistics. We think that,
for “reasonable” z-statistics, such behavior is unlikely in non-experimental
cases because of the limited capacity of authors to predict where the z-
statistics may end up as well as the modest incentives to limit oneself to
small samples, and indeed we find this “thinner tail” pattern only in the
experiments-RCT subsample. However, in order to limit the influence of
very large z-statistics, we will restrict our analysis to z-statistics below 10.
Third, our main assumption that any test with a weakly higher z-
statistic has a higher likelihood of being accepted by a journal requires
that we condition for other heterogeneity across articles. Indeed, when
some papers test a novel relationship, the standards of acceptance may
be lower. We cannot control directly for such unobservable heterogeneity.
Instead, we will show how our results differ between sub-samples chosen
along some important observable characteristics, e.g. being tenured and
age.
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5 Results
In this section, we first apply our estimation strategy to the full sample
and propose non-parametric and parametric analyses. Then, we divide
tests into sub-samples and we provide the results separately for each sub-
sample.
5.1 Non-parametric application
We group observed z-statistics by bandwidth of 0.01 and limit our study
to the interval [0, 10]. Accordingly, the analysis is made on 1, 000 bins.
We estimate the best increasing fit of the ratio of densities thanks to the
Pool-Adjacent-Violators Algorithm.
Figures 4(a)–(f) plot the best increasing fit for the ratio of observed
density to the density of the different inputs, and the associated cumulative
residual.20
Two interpretations emerge from these estimations. First, the best
increasing fit f˜ displays high marginal returns to the value of statistics
∂f˜(z)/∂z only for z ∈ [1.5, 2]. The marginal returns are 0 otherwise. Se-
lection is intense precisely where it is supposed to be discriminatory, i.e.
just before (or between) the thresholds. Second, the misallocation of z-
statistics captured by the cumulated residuals starts to increase slightly
before z = 2 up to 4. In other words, the bulk between p-values of 0.05 and
0.0001 cannot be explained by an increasing selection process alone. At
the maximum, the misallocation reaches 0.028 when using the WDI input,
which means that 2.8% of the total number of statistics are misallocated
between 0 and 4. As there is no residual between 0 and 2, we compare this
2.8% to the total proportion of z-statistics between 2 and 4, i.e. 30% of the
total population. The conditional probability of being misallocated for a z-
statistic between 2 and 4 is thus around 9%. As shown by figures 4(a)–(f),
results do not change depending on the chosen input distribution. Results
are very similar both in terms of shape and magnitude. The upper part of
table 2 summarizes the results of the estimations by providing the maxi-
mum cumulated residual. We can note that our estimates are remarkably
consistent across the different input distributions.
20Note that there are less and less z-statistics per bins of width 0.01. On the right-
hand part of the figures, we can see lines that look like raindrops on a windshield.
Those lines are bins for which there is the same number of observed z-statistics. As this
observed number of z-statistics is divided by a decreasing and continuous function, this
gives these increasing patterns.
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A concern with this estimation strategy is that the misallocation could
reflect different levels of quality between articles with z-statistics between
2 and 4 compared to the rest. We cannot rule out this possibility. How-
ever, two observations gives support to our interpretation: the start of the
misallocation is right after (i) the first significance threshold, and (ii) the
zone where the marginal returns of the selection function are the highest.21
As already suggested by the shapes of weighted distributions, the re-
sults are stronger when the distribution of observed z-statistics is corrected
such that each article or each table contributes the same to the overall
distribution.
Table 2 also presents maximum cumulated residuals obtained when
using raw data, i.e. statistics that have not been de-rounded, and data
smoothed using exclusion of low-precision values as an alternative smooth-
ing method.22 The associated results are very close to the previous ones,
which illustrates the fact that de-rounding is mostly aesthetic.
Even though our results are strongly inconsistent with the presence
of only selection, the distribution of misallocated z-statistics is a little sur-
prising (and not completely consistent with inflation): the surplus observed
between 2 and 4 is here compensated by a deficit after 4. Inflation would
predict such a deficit before 2 (between 1.2 and 1.7, which corresponds
to the valley between the two bumps). This result comes from the fact
that inflation is not well non-parametrically identified. We impose that
any weakly increasing pattern observed in the ratio of densities should be
attributed to the selection function. For instance, the stagnation of the ra-
tio observed before 1.7 is captured by the selection function while one may
think that such stagnation is due to inflation. Nonetheless, as the missing
tests still fall in the bulk between 2 and 4, they allow us to identify a viola-
tion of the presence of selection alone: the bump is too big to be reconciled
with the tail of the distribution. In the next sub-section, we eliminate this
inconsistency by imposing parametric restrictions on the selection process.
21This result is not surprising as it comes from the mere observation that the observed
ratio of densities reaches a maximum between 2 and 4.
22We define low precision values as values reported with a precision equal to 1, where
the precision of a reported number is the number of digits that follows the first non-zero
digit. In the case of statistics reported as the ratio of an estimate to a standard error,
we define the precision of values as the minimum precision of the two parts of the ratio.
For example, 0.001 has precision 1, whereas 2.03 has precision 3. We exclude 11, 302
observations, i.e. about 22% of the sample, according to this criterion.
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5.2 Parametric application
A concern about the previous analysis is that the surplus of misallocated
tests between 2 and 4 is implicitly compensated by missing tests after this
bulk, namely a shortage of tests rejected at very high level of significance.
The mere observation of the distribution of tests does not give the same
intuition. Apart from the bulk between 2 and 4, the other anomaly is
the valley around z = 1.5. This valley is considered as a stagnation of
the selection function in the previous non-parametric case. We consider
here a less conservative test by estimating the selection function under the
assumption that it should belong to a set of parametric functions.
Assume now that the selection process can be approximated by an ex-
ponential polynomial function, i.e. consider a selection function of the
following form:
f(z) = c+ exp(a0 + a1z + a2z
2).
The pattern of this function allows us to account for the concave pattern
of the observed ratio of densities.23
Figure 5(a)–(f) presents the best parametric fits and the cumulative
sums of residuals when using the different inputs. Contrary to the non-
parametric case, the misallocation of statistics starts after z = 1 (p-values
around 0.30) and is decreasing up to z = 1.65 (p-values equals to 0.10 and
first significance threshold). These missing statistics are then completely
retrieved between 1.65 and 4, and no misallocation is left for the tail of
the distribution. This statement holds true for all inputs, but there is an
additional misallocation before z = 1 for Student and Cauchy inputs. This
is due to the very large number of small z-statistics generated by these two
distributions that cannot be perfectly replicated under our assumption that
selection is increasing. In general, however, and as shown in the bottom
part of table 2, the magnitude of misallocation is very similar to the non-
parametric case.
Overall, the pattern of the cumulated residuals observed in these figures
is very consistent with our story: once we account for selection, we identify
a shortage of marginally insignificant tests that is compensated with an
excess of marginally significant results.
23The analysis can be made with simple polynomial functions but it slightly worsens
the fit.
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5.3 Sub-sample analysis
The information we collected about articles and authors allow us to split
the full sample of tests into sub-samples along various dimensions and to
compare our measure of inflation across sub-samples. It seems reasonable
to expect inflation to vary along characteristics of the paper, e.g. the
importance of the empirical contribution, or characteristics of the authors,
e.g. the expected returns from a publication in a prestigious journal.24
In this sub-section, we split the full sample of published z-statistics
along various dimensions and perform a different estimation of the best-
fitting selection function on each sub-sample using the methods presented
above. For space consideration, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of de-
rounded unweighted distributions using the WDI input. Table 3 presents
the maximum cumulated residuals from these estimations.25
We start with the formal analysis of distributions of statistics when
splitting the sample into two rough categories: microeconomics and macroe-
conomics. Maximum cumulated residuals are remarkably similar in both
fields. This suggests that the behavior we are documenting is not due to
heterogeneity across fields. The formal analyses of further (unreported)
decompositions into finer research fields lead to the same conclusion. We
continue by isolating articles that do not present any null result as a con-
tribution. We contrast this analysis with the one of articles whose authors
put forward a null empirical result as their main contribution. While the
number of such articles is way to small to satisfy the requirements of our
accounting method, we find that isolating papers with positive results only
does not change the results. This finding rules away that the our first hump
is due to the presence of null results presented as a main contribution.26
In sub-samples presented in figures 6(a) and (b), we split the full sample
depending on the presentation of the results and the content of the paper.
When distinguishing between tests presented using eye-catchers or not, the
analysis shows that the conditional probability of being misallocated for
24This analysis cannot be considered as causal. From the blank page to the published
research article, researchers choose the topic, collect data, decide on co-authorship,
where to submit the paper, etc. All these choices are made either simultaneously or
sequentially. None of them can be considered as exogenous since they are related to
the expected quality of the outcome and to its expected likelihood to be accepted for
publication.
25The distribution of statistics within each sub-sample, as well as the associated non-
parametric and parametric estimations are presented in the Online Appendix where
supplementary tables also present the maximum cumulated residuals for the same sub-
samples but using other inputs.
26The (unreported) distribution of statistics from paper that explicitly put forward
mixed results naturally exhibits a strong camel shape.
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a z-statistic between 2 and 4 is around 12% in the eye-catchers sample
against 5% in the no eye-catchers sample. Not using stars may act as a
commitment for researchers not to be influenced by the distance of their
tests from the 10% or 5% significance thresholds. Then, we split the sample
depending on whether the test is presented as a main test or not (tests or
results explicitly presented as “complementary”, “additional” or “robustness
checks”). The maximum cumulated residual is around twice as large for
results not presented as a main result. The emphasis put on the empirical
analysis may also depend on the presence of a theoretical contribution. In
articles having a theoretical content, the main contribution of the paper is
divided between theory and empirics and the estimation may be constrained
by the model. These intuitions may explain the shapes of figures 6(c) and
(d): inflation is quite low in articles with a theoretical model compared to
articles that do not offer an explicit theoretical contribution.
One might consider that articles and ideas from researchers with higher
academic rankings are more likely to be valued by editors and referees.
Accordingly, inflation may vary with authors’ status: well-established re-
searchers facing less intense selection should have less incentives to inflate.
A first proxy that we use to capture authors’ status is experience. We com-
pare articles having an average PhD-age of authors below and above the
median PhD-age of the sample. We find that inflation is more pronounced
among relatively younger authors. A second indicator reflecting authors’
status is whether they are involved in the academic editorial process. Ac-
cordingly, we split the sample in two groups: the first is made of articles
published by authors who were not editors or members of editorial boards
before publication, while the second is made of articles published by at
least one editor or member of an editorial board. Inflation appears to be
slightly larger in the first group. Another proxy of authors’ status which is
strongly related to incentives to publish in top journals is whether authors
are tenured or not. We compute the rate of tenure among authors of each
article and split the sample along this dimension.27 We find that the pres-
ence of at least one tenured researcher among authors is associated with a
strong decline in inflation. All in all, these findings seem in line with the
idea that inflation is likely to vary along expected returns to publication in
prestigious journals.
27Getting information about effective tenure status of authors may be difficult as
position denomination varies across countries and institutions. Here, we only consider
full professors as tenured researchers. Furthermore, the length of the publication process
makes it hard to know the precise status of authors at the time of submission. Here, we
arbitrarily consider positions of authors three years before publication.
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We continue by splitting the sample of published tests between single-
authored and co-authored papers: inflation is larger in single-authored pa-
pers. We collected the number of individuals the authors thank and the
number of research assistants mentioned in the published version of the
paper: inflation seems to be smaller when no research assistants are ac-
knowledged and in articles with a relatively low number of thanks.
Whether data and codes are available on the website of the journal
for replication purposes has attracted a great deal of attention lately (see
Dewald et al. 1986 and McCullough et al. 2008). For instance, the AER
implemented a mandatory data and code archive few years ago. On the
other hand, the JPE archive access is available solely to JPE subscribers.
We check for each article whether data and codes are available on the web-
site of the journal. The analysis of the different sub-samples does not show
conclusive evidence that data or programs availability mitigate inflation.
To conclude this sub-sample analysis, we investigate the distribution
of tests depending on the source of data. There is an increasing use of
randomized control trials and laboratory experiments in economics and
many researchers advocate this is a very useful way to accumulate knowl-
edge without relying on questionable specifications. As argued earlier, our
methodology is not adapted to these sources of data: experiments are de-
signed such as to minimize costs while being able to detect an effect and,
by construction, large z-statistics are not likely to appear. Our residual
essentially captures this absence of large z-statistics. Indeed, we find that
inflation is large, which contrasts with the fact that the distribution of
z-statistics for randomized control trials and laboratory experiments does
not exhibit a two humped shape as shown by figure 6(e). A visual inves-
tigation of the distribution reveals that there is neither a valley between
0.25 and 0.10, nor a significant bump around 0.05, but the tail is much
thinner and there are almost no z-statistics after 5. These results confirm
the findings by Vivalt (2015) that specification searching and publication
biases are quite small in randomized controlled trials.
Overall, we find that the intensity of inflation varies along different
dimensions of paper and author characteristics. Interestingly, these varia-
tions seem consistent with the returns to displaying a“significant”empirical
analysis : these evidence give more support to our interpretation in terms
of behavioral responses of researchers.
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6 Conclusion
He who is fixed to a star does not change his mind. (Da Vinci)
There exists substantial information asymmetry between the authors of
an article and the rest of the academic community. Consequently, Olken
(2015) writes that it is believed that “[researchers] are inherently biased
and data mine as much as possible until they find results.” This belief has
direct implications on the behavior of referees and editors who tend to ask
for example for the hidden specifications as robustness checks.
In this paper, we have identified a misallocation in the distribution
of the test statistics in some of the most respected academic journals in
economics. Our analysis suggests that the pattern of this misallocation
is consistent with what we dubbed an inflation bias: researchers might
be tempted to inflate the value of those almost-rejected tests by choosing
a slightly more “significant” specification. We have also quantified this
inflation bias: among the tests that are marginally significant, 10% to 20%
are misreported. These figures are likely to be lower bounds of the true
misallocation as we use conservative collecting and estimating processes.
On the one hand, our results provide some evidence consistent with the
existence of p-hacking thereby justifying the increasing concerns on data
replicability and the implementation of pre-analysis plans. In particular, we
have identified paper and author characteristics that seem to be related to
the inflation bias, e.g., the use of eye-catchers or being in a tenure-track job.
The inflation bias is also associated with the type of empirical analysis (e.g.
randomized control trials) and the existence of a theoretical contribution.
On the other hand, while our missing tests represent a non-negligible share
of the whole population of tests, the bias remains circumscribed (z-statistics
from 1.4 to 2.2).
The external validity of our findings is unclear. Our analysis is restricted
to three top economic journals. In these journals, the rejection rates are
high and the returns to publication are much higher than in other journals.
Some researchers with negative results may send their papers to less presti-
gious journals, and the distribution of tests in the universe of journals may
be less biased than in our distribution. Negative results would then benefit
from less impact but would still contribute to the literature. Moreover, as
opposed to pharmaceutical trials, incentives for data mining are essentially
private in economics (career concerns), and our findings may not translate
to other disciplines (Olken 2015).
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As noted by Fanelli (2009) who discusses explicit professional miscon-
ducts, concerns about the existence of an inflation bias are shared in other
sciences. These concerns naturally gave birth to calls to reduce the selection
and inflation biases and tilt the balance towards “getting it right” rather
than “getting it published” (see Weiss and Wagner 2011 and Nosek et al.
2012 among others). For instance, journals (the Journal of Negative Re-
sults in BioMedecine or the Journal of Errology) have been launched with
the ambition of giving a place where authors may publish non-significant
findings. Alternative solutions may rely on sealed-envelope submissions
(Dufwenberg and Martinsson 2014). Similarly, pre-analysis plans have been
proposed (and used) in natural sciences, but also in social sciences (see
Miguel et al. 2014 and Olken 2015 for economics), to reduce data mining.
In this paper, we provide evidence that academic economists respond to
publication incentives, which justifies these concerns. While the distortion
we document can been considered as moderate (Olken 2015), it would be
very interesting to replicate our methodology to other disciplines where
the incentives are thought to be more distorted, e.g., in medicine with the
FDA approval processes. Furthermore, it seems important to investigate
whether and how researchers’ behavior changed following the implementa-
tion of the above mentioned policies. This would echo the distant call by
Mahoney (1977) who pointed out that understanding the effects of norms
requires not only the identification of the biases, but also an understanding
of how the academic community adapts its behavior to those norms, and
how beliefs evolve with such adaptation.
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Figure 1: Distributions of z-statistics.
(a) Raw distribution of z-statistics. (b) De-rounded distribution of z-statistics.
(c) De-rounded distribution of z-statistics,
weighted by articles.
(d) De-rounded distribution of z-statistics,
weighted by articles and tables.
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011). See the text for the de-rounding method. The distribution
presented in sub-figure (c) uses the inverse of the number of tests presented in the same article to
weight observations. The distribution presented in sub-figure (d) uses the inverse of the number of tests
presented in the same table (or result) multiplied by the inverse of the number of tables in the article
to weight observations. Lines correspond to kernel density estimates.
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Figure 2: Distribution of z-statistics and candidate exogenous inputs.
(a) Gaussian/Student inputs (0 < z < 10). (b) Gaussian/Student inputs (5 < z < 20).
(c) Cauchy inputs (0 < z < 10). (d) Cauchy inputs (5 < z < 20).
(e) Empirical inputs (0 < z < 10). (f) Empirical inputs (5 < z < 20).
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011). Unweighted distributions plotted using de-rounded statis-
tics.
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Figure 3: Distributions of z-statistics for different sub-samples: microeco-
nomics versus macroeonomics, and nature of empirical evidence.
(a) Null results. (b) Positive results.
(c) Microeconomics. (d) Macroeconomics.
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011). Distributions are unweighted and plotted using de-rounded
statistics. Lines correspond to kernel density estimates.
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Figure 4: Non-parametric estimation of selection and inflation.
(a) Student(1) input. (b) Cauchy(0.5) input.
(c) WDI input. (d) VHLSS input.
(e) QOG input. (f) PSID input.
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011).
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Figure 5: Parametric estimation of selection and inflation.
(a) Student(1) input. (b) Cauchy(0.5) input.
(c) WDI input. (d) VHLSS input.
(e) QOG input. (f) PSID input.
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011).
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Figure 6: Distributions of z-statistics for different sub-samples: use of eye-
catchers, presence of a theoretical contribution, and type of data used.
(a) Eye-catchers. (b) No eye-catchers.
(c) Model. (d) No model.
(e) Lab. experiments or RCT data. (f) Other data.
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011). Distributions are unweighted and plotted using de-rounded
statistics. Lines correspond to kernel density estimates.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Number of . . .
Articles Tables Tests
American Economic Review 327 1,561 21,934
[51] [46] [44]
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 625 9,311
[17] [18] [19]
Journal of Political Economy 204 1,203 18,833
[32] [35] [38]
Macroeconomics 154 887 13,563
[24] [26] [27]
Microeconomics 487 2,502 36,515
[76] [74] [73]
Positive results 544 2,778 40,582
[85] [82] [81]
Mixed results 81 508 8,408
[13] [15] [17]
Null results 16 103 1,088
[2] [3] [2]
Using eye-catchers 385 2,043 32,269
[60] [60] [64]
Main results 2,487 35,288
[73] [70]
With model 229 979 15,727
[36] [29] [31]
Single-authored 135 695 10,586
[21] [21] [21]
At least one editor 400 2,145 31,649
[62] [63] [63]
At least one tenured author 312 1,659 25,159
[49] [49] [50]
With research assistants 361 2,009 30,578
[56] [59] [61]
Data and codes available 292 1,461 20,392
[46] [43] [41]
Lab. experiments or RCT data 122 593 7,535
[19] [17] [15]
Other data 522 2,798 42,543
[81] [83] [85]
Sources: AER, JPE, and QJE (2005-2011). This table reports the number of tests, tables, and articles for each category.
Tables are tables or results’ groups presented in the text. Proportions relatively to the total population are indicated
between brackets. Macroeconomics and microeconomics are two aggregated research fields. Positive, mixed, and negative
results correspond to the nature of the main contribution as stated by authors. Using eyes-catchers corresponds to articles
or tables using stars or bold printing to highlight statistical significance. Main corresponds to results non explicitly
presented as robustness checks, additional or complementary by the authors. At least one editor corresponds to articles
with at least one member of an editorial board prior to the publication year among the authors. At least one tenured
author corresponds to articles with at least one full professor three years before the publication year among the authors.
Data and codes available corresponds to articles for which data and codes can be directly downloaded from the journal’s
website. Lab. experiments or RCT data stands for tests using data from laboratory experiments or randomized control
trials. The sum of articles or tables by type of data slightly exceeds the total number of articles or tables as results using
different data sets may be presented in the same article or table.
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Table 2: Summary of parametric and non-parametric estimations using various inputs.
Maximum cumulated residual from non-parametric estimation
De-rounded statistics Raw statistics
Weighted Weighted Full Excluding
Input Unweighted by article by table sample low-precision
Student(1) 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.018 0.021
Cauchy(0.5) 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.014
WDI 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.028 0.031
VHLSS 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.023
QOG 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.018
PSID 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.017
Maximum cumulated residual from parametric estimation
De-rounded statistics Raw statistics
Weighted Weighted Full Excluding
Input Unweighted by article by table sample low-precision
Student(1) 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.026 0.027
Cauchy(0.5) 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.018
WDI 0.033 0.037 0.038 0.031 0.032
VHLSS 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.022
QOG 0.023 0.025 0.026 0.020 0.021
PSID 0.031 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.025
Sources: AER, JPE, QJE (2005-2011), and authors’ calculation. See the text for the definitions of weights and sample
restrictions.
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Table 3: Summary of non-parametric and parametric estimations using the empirical
WDI input for various sub-samples.
Maximum cumulated Maximum cumulated
residual from residual from
Sample non-parametric estimation parametric estimation
Macroeconomics 0.027 0.033
Microeconomics 0.030 0.030
Positive results 0.028 0.032
Null results1 0.073 0.007
Eye-catchers 0.036 0.037
No eye-catchers 0.015 0.020
Main results 0.024 0.028
Non-main results 0.042 0.040
With model 0.008 0.012
Without model 0.040 0.039
Low average PhD-age 0.048 0.047
High average PhD-age 0.011 0.015
No editor 0.032 0.033
At least one editor 0.026 0.030
No tenured author 0.040 0.041
At least one tenured author 0.017 0.021
Single authored 0.041 0.040
Co-authored 0.024 0.028
With research assistants 0.034 0.035
Without research assistants 0.018 0.023
Low number of thanks 0.019 0.023
High number of thanks 0.035 0.036
Data and codes available 0.029 0.032
Data or codes not available 0.027 0.030
Lab. experiments or RCT data1 0.053 0.041
Other data 0.024 0.029
Sources: AER, JPE, QJE (2005-2011) and authors’ calculation. Low average PhD-age corresponds to articles written by
authors whose average age since PhD is below the median of the articles’ population. Low number of thanks corresponds
to articles where the number of individuals thanked in the title’s footnote is below the median of the articles’ population.
See notes of table 1 for the definitions of other categories.
1: These estimates are not reliable. In the case of articles reporting null results as their main contribution, the number of
observations is way too low to apply our accounting method. In the case of laboratory experiments or randomized control
trials, large z-statistics are less likely to appear which violates our methodological hypothesis that selection is increasing.
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Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1.
As f is strictly increasing in e for any given z, there exists a unique hz
such that:
f(z, e) ≥ F ⇔ e ≥ hz
Note that the function h : z 7→ hz should be non-increasing. Otherwise,
there would exist z1 < z2 such that hz1 < hz2 . This is absurd as F =
f(z1, hz1) ≤ f(z2, hz1) < f(z2, hz2) = F . This part shows that an increasing
function G˜ verifying G˜(h(z)) = 1 − r(z) can easily be constructed and is
uniquely defined on the image of h. Note that G is not uniquely defined
outside of this set. This illustrates that G can take any values in the range
of contributions where articles are always rejected or accepted irrespectively
of their t-statistics.
Finally, we need to show that such a function G˜ can be defined as a
surjection (−∞,∞) 7→ [0, 1], i.e. G˜ can be the cumulative of a distribution.
To verify this, note that on the image of h, G˜ is equal to 1− r(z). Conse-
quently, G˜(h([0, Tlim])) ⊂ [0, 1] and G˜ can always be completed outside of
this set to be a surjection.
Note that for any given observed output and any selection function, an
infinite sequence {Gz}z may transform the input into the output through f .
The intuition is the following: for any given z, the only crucial quantity is
how many ε would help pass the threshold. The shape of the distribution
above or below the key quality h(z) does not matter. When we limit
ourselves to an invariant distribution, G is uniquely determined as h(z)
covers the interval of contribution.
Proof. Corollary 1.
Given lemma 1, the only argument that needs to be made is that the
image of the function
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz × r˜ is in [0, 1]. To
prove this, remark first that the image of
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
ϕ(z)dz×
ψ/ϕ is in [0, 1] as it is equal to
∫∞
0
[
1f(z,ε)≥FdGz(ε)dε
]
. Finally, note that
max[0,∞)(f) ≤ max[0,∞)(ψ/ϕ) and min[0,∞)(f) ≥ min[0,∞)(ψ/ϕ). Other-
wise, the function equal to r˜ but bounded by the bounds of ψ/ϕ would be
a better increasing fit of the ratio ψ/ϕ.
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